Volumes 108 & 111, The Jellicoe Papers, Vol. I & II
ed. A. Temple Patterson

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This substantial selection of Admiral Jellicoe's professional and private papers extends from 1893 to 1935. Its publication was directly followed in 1969, by Professor Patterson's succinct biography of the admiral. Since then, a resurgence of interest in the Battle of Jutland and in pre-war naval provision has resulted from the publication (in 1989 and 1993) of Professor Ranft’s The Beatty Papers (NRS Vols. 128 & 132) and from the publication in 1984 of Professor Sumida's edition of The Pollen Papers (NRS Vol. 124), followed in 1989 by his book In Defence of Naval Supremacy. Sumida reopened the question of British gunnery at, and before, Jutland. Since then Paul Halpern, in his Naval History of World War I (1994), has provided a comprehensive account and assessment of all the participants. For any further reconsideration of this complex period, The Jellicoe Papers, together with The Beatty Papers, will remain a primary source.

The first volume merely touches, in an introduction, on Jellicoe's time as DNO, but there are documents for his time as Controller and a few for the years 1910 to 1914. Then, in Part II, nearly a hundred fascinating pages track his initial twelve months, from August 1914, as C-in-C of the Grand Fleet. His abiding sensitivity to the pervasive danger from mines and submarines is soon communicated to Battenburg: 'Scapa is the only base we have which is almost safe against submarines.' There are nine pages of extracts from Grand Fleet Battle Orders foreshadowing aspects of the battle which would eventually come: 'I shall probably deploy at a range of about 16,000 yards'; and 'I attach the greatest importance to making use of our heavier guns in the early stages at long range.' Then Churchillian ideas about attacking Heligoland are duly rebutted and Jellicoe's plans for ensuring the distant blockade of Germany, while avoiding mines and submarines, come to the fore. Put simply, 'My object therefore will be to fight the fleet action in the Northern portion of the North Sea.' Speed, he believes, is the best safeguard against submarines. Minesweeping and minelaying are recurrent subjects. In November Jellicoe vehemently protests against Fisher's detachment of a third battle cruiser to deal with von Spee. He sends a detailed comparison of the opposing battlefleets to the Admiralty. Then the old subject of a German invasion of Britain suddenly re-surfaces and Jellicoe reiterates all the reasons, well-known to him, why provision against this remote possibility is already sufficient. Elsewhere, Fisher urges, 'it is NOT numbers, it is SOLELY gunnery efficiency', that will win the big battle. While arranging additional gunnery practice (at the usual rather invariable ranges), Jellicoe comments (19 Nov) that 'German gunnery has been markedly excellent'. By January 1915 Fisher reacting to menace of Churchill and the Dardanelles, wholeheartedly identifies with Jellicoe's insistence on all sorts of reinforcements in the North Sea.

In Part III, a further hundred pages cover the period February 1915 to February 1916. The Dogger Bank action is analysed, especially the gunnery. The question of the North Sea bases is debated. Elsewhere Fisher complains of Jellicoe's 'lugubrious forecasts'. However, on 17 May, Crease writes that Fisher has resigned, having tired of always 'watching the First Lord instead of the Germans'. Jellicoe urges the Admiralty to provide for more minesweeping and for further offensive mining. He also suggests air spotting by seaplanes. Jellicoe and Beatty agree in deploring the 'battle practice' results of Tiger and Lion. More such practice is the only remedy envisaged. In January 1916 Jellicoe writes generally to Balfour about tactics and strategy. He rules out sending the fleet to the Baltic but endorses submarine operations there. The volume concludes in Part IV with the long-awaited event of. Jutland and its Preliminaries and its Aftermath' (pp. 211-308) . Here, a great deal - if not quite all - is revealed. There are four excellent diagrams. (See also The Beatty Papers.)

Volume II runs to 497 pages. Part I (109pp.) covers 'The Grand Fleet After Jutland' up to December 1916. Jellicoe's largely successful attempts to rectify perceived shortcomings constitute the main theme. He presses for the fleet to be supplied with improved armour-piercing shell (something not actually achieved until April 1918). There is interesting material on the loss of the Hampshire, together with Lord Kitchener, in 1916.

Part II (152pp.) , features Jellicoe as First Sea Lord. The U-boat crisis of 1917 is the central theme. (The Beatty Papers provide much further comment.) Duff's minute of 26th April shows that trial convoys were certainly being prepared before Lloyd George's visit to the Admiralty on the 30th. Unsurprisingly, Jellicoe's concern about numbers of available escorts persists. Then follows material on his dismissal in December.

In Part III, there are 133 pages on Jellicoe's 'Empire Mission' (December 1917 to February 1920), comprising his advice to India and the Dominions on the development of their navies. Then come, finally, 170 pages on 'The Jutland Controversy' and Harper's Narrative. (Here again, as so often, The Beatty Papers provide much important complementary matter.) In 1921 Jellicoe makes a single enigmatic reference to Pollen: 'It fell to me to turn down his inventions on more than one occasion.' However, against a turbulent background of relative economic decline and adjustment to new techniques and processes, Britannia had - thanks to Jellicoe among others - punched well above her weight.