Volumes 14 & 21, The Blockade of Brest 1803-1805, Vo1.I & II
ed. J. Leyland (1898 & 1901)

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The blockade of Brest of 1803-05 is covered in two volumes and concentrates on the achievements of the Hon. William Cornwallis and his captains. Leyland was of the opinion that the work of the blockaders was ‘more important and more successful than that of Nelson at the same period’. More succinctly these volumes contain material concerning operations under Cornwallis’ command, which geographically included Lorient, Rochefort, Ferrol, the Bay of Biscay and further to the west. Other important individuals who had a controlling hand in these operations included Lord Keith, Sir James Saumarez, Sir Edward Pellew and Sir Sidney Smith, although only a small number of papers from these individuals are included in this selection.

The selection of letters concentrates on the system of blockade used by Cornwallis, particularly the tactics he adopted and the close management of Lorient and Rochefort. The importance of ships returning to Britain from the West Indies was paramount but Cornwallis’ failure to capture any noteworthy French warships is lain at the door of the lack of frigates, which failure subsequently caused resources to be spread more thinly. Admiralty orders to Cornwallis and their view on his deployment tactics are included in volume one.

Material covering the invasion plans of Southern England and Ireland, with the subsequent orders given to captains, should such an event become a reality, can be found. As well as letters concerning the state of Brest and the problems the French faced with impressments, defence and the management of resources requiring intervention by Napoleon to resolve. Throughout can be seen Cornwallis’ masterly command of the watch kept over the French and comparisons made with Nelson at Toulon, particularly his planning for emergencies, allowance for every contingency, supply, protection of trade and the motivation of his men. Sir Edward Pellew stands out as an exceptional seaman and diplomatist, although his successor at Ferrol, Rear-Admiral Cochrane, was not of the same high standard but his efficiency for victualling is apparent. Materials for the conditions of the lower ranks have also been included, as well as the mutinies being a black mark against numerous gallant naval actions, many of which resulted in casualties and prizes.

The second volume includes amongst many events: Capt. Puget’s plan for burning the French fleet in Brest, which was modified by Capt. Brisbane but never sanctioned by the Admiralty Board. Whilst blockaded Napoleon gave instructions for his men to be kept busy, even though his training suggestions were punitive; Napoleon’s grander plans to break the blockade, his operations in Ireland and the West Indies; Cochrane’s involvement with the Spanish preceding the secret convention between Spain and France on 4 January 1805 and the cessation of the close blockade gave France the ascendancy. Gantaeaume’s actions after taking command of operations was faced with a grandiose scheme prepared by Napoleon, but it was the latter’s order which prevented any great success by continuing with Villeneuve and breaking the blockade.

Disagreements between the top level of management can be seen during 1805 when pressure was intensifying on both sides, especially when Villeneuve escaped from Toulon. Papers showing Villeneuve’s subsequent engagement with Calder, as well as Cornwallis’s decision to divide the fleet, and Villeneuve’s failure to accomplish Napoleon’s strategy, provide a picture of the run up to Trafalgar and the run down of the blockade after the battle.

Sources

From TNA are documents from the series of admirals’ dispatches, secret letters, Secretary’s letters to commanding officers, orders and instructions, Lords’ letter books, ships’ logs, captains’ letters and records of courts martial. Family papers then in the possession of Colonel W. Cornwallis West, including correspondence with Lord Melville and Corwallis’s order book, as well as papers belonging to Mr C. Wykeham Martin and Lieut. H. Blackett R.N. French sources at the Ministère de la Marine and the Bibliothèque Nationale, and in archives at Brest, Lorient and Rochefort.

Career outline

Born 20 February 1743/4 the fourth son of the first Earl Cornwallis. Entered the navy in 1755 and served under Boscawen on the North American station, being at Louisbourg in 1758 and Quiberon Bay a year later. Appointed lieutenant of the Thunderer in 1761 and was appointed to the command of the Wasp sloop in 1762, followed by commands of the Swift, Prince Edward, Guadelope and Pallas, variously in the Mediterranean and West Indies. He served on the Isis and Bristol under Lord Howe on the North American station, returning to England in 1778 when he was appointed to the Lion. In 1779 he took part in the Battle of Grenada and in the follwing year had two encounters with the French. He joined Sir Samuel Hood in the West Indies in 1781, serving aboard the Canada during the repulse of De Grasse at St Kitts in 1782 and with Rodney off Dominica. In 1789 he became commander-in-chief on the East Indies station, returning to England in 194 as a rear-admiral and in July was promoted to vice-admiral (having hoisted his flag on the Excellent, Caesar and Royal Sovereign). After an encounter with the squadron of Villaret-Joyeuse he was appointed commander-in-chief West Indies in 1796 but court martialled for failing to sail aboard a frigate. He was promoted to Admiral in 1799 and in the next year succeeded Lord St Vincent in command of the Channel; the material in these volumes covers the period after this.

Contents

Further Reading

Extracts

Volume I, pages 343-5 number 262 Captain Whitby to Cornwallis

[The letter opens with Captain Whitby’s account of his arrival in England, and an expression of his desire to serve with Admiral Cornwallis. He had landed at Dover, and been to ‘White’s among the politicians,’ whose views he reports.]

By-the-bye, I want to communicate one thing to you which appears to me of great consequence; and, but that our seas are so clear, and our posts go so safe, I should have first sent you a cipher, by which it could have come to no one’s knowledge but yourself. It, however, may be told in very few words, and I shall do it. Though Lord Nelson is indefatigable in keeping the sea, there are so many reasons that make it possible for the French to escape through the Mediterranean, which, of course, Government are not told by him – and which, perhaps, he does not consider (at least I think so) – that I have been long determined to warn you of the circumstance upon my arrival, not choosing to trust it from the Mediterranean. First, then, he does not cruise upon his rendezvous; second, I have consequently repeatedly known him from a week to three weeks, and even a month, unfound by ships sent to reconnoitre – the Belleisle herself was a week; thirdly, he is occasionally obliged to take the whole squadron in to water, a great distance from Toulon; fourthly, since I came away the French squadron got out in his absence, and cruised off Toulon several days, and at last, when he came out, he only got sight of them at a great distance, to see them arrive at their own harbour. From all this I draw one general conclusion – that it is very possible for them to escape him. Upon the last occasion they might have got to the West Indies, or elsewhere, without the possibility of discovery, had they so chosen. And from all this, I draw all these particular ones likewise, concurring with other circumstances: they have ten sail of the line at Toulon, one at Cadiz, four, I think, at Ferrol, six at Rochefort, and twenty, you say, at Brest, making in all one-and-forty sail of the line. If they pass Lord Nelson, they can relieve Cadiz (which is only blockaded by two frigates), Ferrol, Rochefort; and if in their way to Brest you meet them some morning, when they are attempting a grand injunction, I shall not be surprised. I mention this to you that you may pay what attention you choose to this scheme of probabilities, and have your ships so much in your eye at daylight that you may be prepared for their reception.

            I write this in confidence to you, for I would not absolutely dare to give my opinion of the Mediterranean blockade to any other person; for doubtless my Lord Nelson is actuated by a thorough zeal to do right, for he is, indeed, a great and glorious officer. I must add one other thing, however, which is, that in gales of wind he drives so far away that the finding him is very difficult, and the enemy have the greatest chance. I have no doubt, therefore, that they can come out; the rest, the object, remains to be proved. I must tell you another thing. Gore in the Medusa is so inattentive, in my opinion, to his situation in Gibraltar, which I consider the picquet-guard of you and my Lord Nelson, and from which, and which only, you could reasonably hope for intelligence, that I would not advise you to trust to it. When I was there, three ships out of four were stripped for several days; this I think of the very last importance. I may have judged erroneously throughout, but there will be no arm in the hint, which I am convinced you can receive from no other quarter. God bless you my dear Admiral! . . . I shall say no more than that I am your most sincere and affectionate friend,

J.W.

Volume II, pages 311-13 number 561 Cornwallis to Marsden, and Sir Robert Caldeer to Cornwallis

CORNWALLIS TO MARSDEN

Ville de Paris, off Ushant, 28th July, 1805, 8 p.m.

Sir, - I have the pleasure to inclose for the information of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty a letter from Vice-Admiral Sir Robert Calder, giving an account of his success against the combined squadron of France and Spain.

            I have the honour to be, &c.,

                        W. Cornwallis.

INCLOSURE

SIR ROBERT CALDER TO CORNWALLIS

[Quadruplicate]

Prince of Wales, 23rd July, 1805, Ferrol bearing East, distance 49 leagues; Cape Finisterre, S. 52° E., distance 39 leagues.

            Sir,- Yesterday at noon I was favoured with a view of the combined squadrons of France and Spain, consisting of 20 sail of the line, also three large ships armed en flute, of about 50 guns each, with five frigates and three brigs; the force under my directions at this time consisting of 15 sail of the line, two frigates, a cutter and lugger. I immediately stood towards the enemy with the squadron, making the need for signals for battle in the closest order, and, on closing with them, I made the signal for attacking their centre. When I had reached their rear, I tacked the squadron in succession. This brought us close under their lee, when our headmost ships reached their centre, the enemy were taking in succession. This obliged me to make again the same manoeuvre, by which I brought on a very decisive action, which lasted upwards of four hours, when I found it necessary to bring to the squadron to cover the captured ships, whose names are in the margin.

            I have to observe the enemy had every advantage of wind and weather during the whole day. The weather had been foggy at times a great part of the morning, and very soon after we had brought them to action the fog was so thick at intervals that we could with great difficulty see thee ships ahead or astern of us. This rendered it impossible to take the advantages of the enemy by signals, as I could have wished to have done. Had the weather been more favourable I am led to believe the victory would have been more complete.

            I have very great pleasure in saying every ship exerted and was conducted in the most masterly style, and I beg leave here publicly to return to Rear-Admiral Charles Stirling, and every captain, officer, and man whom I had the honour to command on that day my most grateful thanks for their very conspicuous, gallant, and very judicious good conduct.

            The Honourable Captain Gardner, of The Hero, led the van squadron in a most masterly and officer-like manner, to whom I feel myself particularly indebted, as also to Captain Cuming for his assistance during the action.

            Inclosed is a list of the killed and wounded on board the different ships. The enemy must have suffered greatly. They are now in sight to windward, and, when I have secured the captured ships, and put the squadron to rights, I shall endeavour to avail myself of every opportunity that may offer to give you some further account of these combined squadrons.

            At the same time it will behove me to be upon my guard against the combined squadrons at Ferrol, as I am lead to believe they have sent off one or two of their cripple ships last night for that port. Therefore, possibly I may find it necessary to make a junction with you immediately off Ushant with the whole squadron.

            I have the honour to be, &c.,

                        Robt. Calder.

P.S. – I am under the necessity of sending the Windsor Castle to you, in consequence of the damage she sustained in the action. Captain Buller has acquainted me that the prisoners on board the prizes assert Ferrol to be the port to which the enemy’s squadrons are bound, as you will perceive by letters inclosed with my original despatch, together with other private information.

                        Robt. Calder.

San Rafael, 84 guns; Firme, 74.